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                                                            Abstract 
 
           An integrated watershed management framework that combines detailed spatial 
biophysical attributes of land with a hydrologic model and an economic model is developed to 
study the cost-effective enrollment of land in the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program 
(CREP). Compared with previous related studies that assumed exogenous sediment deposition 
coefficients related only to site specific characteristics, this research explicitly considers 
endogenous sediment deposition coefficients, that are determined by landuse decisions made by 
all land parcels in the run-off path, in determining land rental offers. The modeling framework is 
applied to one of the eligible watersheds, Court Creek, in Illinois. We find that the optimal 
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Optimal Targeting of CREP to Improve Water Quality:   
Determining Land Rental Offers with Endogenous Sediment Deposition Coefficients 
 
 
  Growing concern about the adverse effects of agricultural activities on water quality has 
redirected the focus of soil conservation programs from reducing on-site erosion and maintaining soil 
productivity on fields towards reducing off-site damages to water bodies from sediment flows and nitrate 
run-off from fields. This shift in emphasis has led to the establishment of modified soil conservation 
programs that supplement the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) by focusing on eligible land in 
narrowly defined zones and having numeric goals for environmental improvement. 
The Illinois Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) represents one of these new 
programs, initiated in 1998, to supplement the CRP and protect water quality in the Illinois River. It seeks 
to retiring environmentally sensitive cropland into grasses, trees and wetlands for at least 15 years and 
possibly for 30 years or permanently. Among the multiple objectives of the CREP are those of reducing 
sediment loading in the main stream of the Illinois River by 20 percent and nitrate loading by 10 percent. 
The CREP targets primarily cropland within the riparian buffer or 100-year floodplains of the rivers and 
streams in the Middle Illinois River Basin. Even within this zone of eligible land, there are 5.14 million 
acres of cropland, of which CREP seeks to retire only 0.23 million acres. There is thus a need for 
selectivity in the land to be enrolled in CREP. This would require information about land characteristics 
and their polluting potential at a detailed level as well as criteria to identify the land to be enrolled to 
achieve the desired environmental objectives at least cost.  
A few studies have sought to d evelop criteria to identify the land that should be enrolled in the 
CRP. These include Ribaudo (1989) that analyzes alternative criteria for enrolling land to improve water 
quality given a fixed goal of the total amount of land to be enrolled.  Babcock et al. (1996) examine the 
criteria to allocate a fixed budget to enroll land into a conservation program to maximize environmental 
benefits. These studies show that policy makers should purchase land with a high ratio of environmental 
benefits to enrollment costs measured in terms of dollars or acres enrolled. This can be achieved by 
prioritizing cropland according to their benefit cost ratio and then enrolling land selectively.    3
The implementation of such an approach is complicated for at least two reasons. First, the 
estimation of the potential environmental benefit of enrolling a land parcel is difficult because it depends 
not only on its own site-specific characteristics but also on the landuse decisions of parcels upstream and 
downstream from it. For example, the off-site damage to water quality due to erosion generated by a land 
parcel does not depend only on its own land-use choice and site-specific characteristics. It depends also 
on the availability of intervening land lying in the direction of the water flow and the sediment trapping 
efficiency (the portion of the sediment deposited on a land parcel and prevented from entering a water 
body) of these intervening land parcels. The trapping efficiency of a parcel depends on its own landuse 
decision and site-specific characteristics and on the amount of run-off flowing from upstream, which in 
turn depends on landuse decisions and site-specific characteristics of upstream parcels.  
Second, even after the land to be enrolled has been identified, the implementation of that optimal 
enrollment plan in a decentralized decision making setting requires the provision of economic incentives 
to induce landowners to voluntarily retire their land. Hence there is a need to develop economic 
instruments that provide incentives for the landowners of the targeted cropland to retire their land. One 
such incentive-based instrument is a land rental payment scheme. With heterogeneity in site-specific 
characteristics and in the contribution of land parcels to off-site damages, these land rental offers need to 
differ across land parcels depending on their potential for sediment abatement if retired from crop 
production. Since the abatement potential of a land parcel is not exogenously determined but is dependent 
on landuse choices of upstream and downstream parcels which in turn are dependent on rental payment 
offers to those parcels, both rental payment offers and abatement potential need to be endogenously and 
simultaneously determined. 
The first objective of this paper is to develop a methodology to identify the optimal enrollment of 
land in a watershed to achieve the pre-determined goals of reducing multiple pollutants, sediment and 
nitrate, at least cost. We develop an integrated watershed management framework that combines detailed 
spatial biophysical attributes of land using a GIS database with a hydrologic model that recognizes the 
inter-relationships between land parcels in determining their sediment trapping efficiency. The hydrologic   4
and spatial characteristics of land are then incorporated into an economic model to identify cropland that 
would satisfy the CREP’s sediment and nitrate reduction goals at least cost.  
The second objective of the paper is to determine the optimal land-rental scheme required to 
achieve voluntary enrollment of the targeted land while accounting for interdependence between land 
parcels in their deposition ratios and abatement potential. We analyze how the per acre land rental offers 
vary with site-specific characteristics of land parcels. We then compare t he cost-effectiveness of the 
optimal rental scheme with a land rental scheme that offers a uniform per acre rental offer for all parcels. 
The latter policy closely resembles the current policy approach for the implementation of the CREP that 
has fixed caps on per acre rental payments for land retirement offers in the eligible zone for each county 
based on typical cash rents in that county.  Such a policy creates incentives for enrollment of land with 
low opportunity costs and not land with the highest environmental benefits-cost ratio unless costs and 
environmental benefits are highly negatively correlated. This framework is applied to one of the eligible 
watersheds, Court Creek, in Illinois, which is a pilot watershed for the CREP. 
 
I.  Previous Literature  
The existing literature analyzing the optimal land enrollment decision in  the CRP has relied on 
spatially aggregated data and analyzed the impact of the CRP either for a single representative farmer 
(Gillespie et al, 1990; Young, 1991; Johnson, 1993) or at a regional level (Ribaudo, 1989; Babcock et al., 
1996; Kozloff, 1989). While the former studies ignore spatial issues and the impact of retirement on off-
site water quality benefits, the latter studies rely primarily on the National Resource Inventory (NRI) and 
on the U.S. Geological Survey’s National Stream Quality Accounting Network (NASQUAN) for data to 
determine those off-site benefits. The NRI determines the eligible cropland for the CRP using data for a 
few discrete points in each state in the U.S. while NASQUAN provides data on water quality at 470 
monitoring stations in the U.S. As a result these studies are spatially too aggregated to allow precise 
targeting based on hydrologically determined impact on water quality. Ribaudo (1986, 1989) assumes a 
fixed sediment transport relationship based on soil characteristics while linking on-site erosion to off-site   5
damages. Babcock et al. (1996) also construct an environmental damage index based on fixed site-
specific characteristics and the universal soil loss equation which provides a measure of on-site erosion.  
Several studies have incorporated detailed site-specific characteristics to analyze optimal changes 
in land management practices such as tillage or crop rotation and implications of fertilizer restrictions. 
Many of these have focused on the costs of reducing on-site erosion on fields in a watershed (Prato and 
Wu, 1991, 1996; Boggess et al., 1979; Seitz et al., 1979). Other studies have focused on reducing off-site 
damages due to sediment. These  studies differ in their assumed linkages between on-site pollution 
generation and off-site damages, particularly for sediment. While many of them assume a fixed 
relationship between the two (see the survey in Braden et al., 1989; Carpentier et al., 1998), the study by 
Braden et al. recognizes that off-site damages are not proportional to on-site discharges, because the latter 
may be intercepted by intervening land parcels depending on the site-specific characteristics and 
management practices of those downstream parcels. This allows partial endogenization of the sediment 
deposition coefficients with the management practice choice of land parcels. However, Braden et al. do 
not incorporate the effect of the volume of pollution flowing into a land parcel from u pstream on the 
capacity of that land parcel to intercept pollution. They also do not analyze alternative policy instruments 
that could be used to achieve land-use changes in a decentralized setting.  
Lintner and Weersink (1999) developed a model that fully endogenizes the sediment deposition 
relationship while analyzing policies to control sediment bound emissions of nitrogen and phosphorus 
through changes in tillage and rotation practices. The present  study expands the focus of landuse 
management models from a control of a single pollutant to multiple pollutants, namely, sediment and 
nitrate, and extends their framework to analyze the optimal targeting of discrete changes in landuse from 
cropland to permanent cover through enrollment in CREP.  
 
II.  Conceptual Framework 
 
  The framework developed here analyzes optimal land retirement decisions in a watershed to 
achieve a specified upper bound on the level of a pollutant. The watershed is divided into run-off   6
channels, or flow paths, each denoted by j=1,..J, by which pollutants are transported from a land parcel to 
the water-body. Each flow path is divided into i=1,..Ij  land parcels of equal size, a, with parcel i=1 in 
each flow path being the closest to the water-body. Each flow path is well defined, unique, and 
independent of others and each land parcel is assumed to be homogeneous in terms of its site-specific 
characteristics. A land parcel is assumed to have a choice between two activities, denoted by k, where 
k=0 indicates retirement of land and k=1 indicates cropping of land. Suppose xijk is the land allocated to 
the k
th activity where 0£xijk£a with  
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Let pij1 be the per acre quasi-rents earned through cropping on the i
th land parcel in the j
th channel 
and pij0 =0 be the per acre quasi-rents earned if this land parcel is retired from cropping and converted to 
permanent cover. Since we are focusing on land parcels that are currently under crop production, it is 
reasonable to assume that pij1>0.  For simplicity, we assume here that each land parcel generates a single 
pollutant, sediment. The empirical model extends this to also include nitrate run-off generated by each 
land parcel.  For activity k, the emissions per acre are denoted by eijk. The total amount of sediment 
produced by the i
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A percentage di,i-m,j of the sediment produced by the i
th parcel is deposited in each of the i-m 
downstream parcels in flow path  j, where m=0,..i-1.  This is referred to as the deposition ratio of land 
parcel i-m which depends on that parcel’s site-specific characteristics Li-m,j, landuse decision  xi-m,j,k and 
amount of sediment Si-m,j flowing into that parcel. Thus, 
(2)    ) S , x , L ( d d j , m i k , j , m i j , m i j , m i , i j , m i , i - - - - - = for m=1,…i-1, where                      
(3)  ) x , L ( S S k , j , q m i q m i j , m i + - + - - =  for q=1,…Ij-(i-m)      
                
The amount of sediment Si-m,j depends on the site-specific characteristics and landuse decisions by each of 
the q land parcels that are upstream from it. As Si-m,j increases, the deposition ratio  di,i-m,j is expected to   7
decrease. The total amount of sediment S generated in the watershed that is loaded to the river is the sum 
of sediment loadings from the outlet of each run-off channel: 
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Suppose a social planner wants to maximize the total quasi-rent in the watershed, subject to (1) and a 
constraint on the maximum level of sediment,  S , that is loaded to the river. The Lagrangian of this 
optimization problem is represented as follows: 
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The first order optimality condition is: 
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where l represents the marginal cost of sediment abatement (dollars per ton of sediment) and the term in 
square brackets is the per acre contribution of the i
th parcel to off-site sediment (tons of sediment per 
acre). Since the sediment run-off from all flow paths contributes additively to the total sediment loading 
in the watershed, it is cost-effective to pay a uniform price per ton of sediment abatement in the 
watershed. The product of l and the term in square brackets is the cost of sediment abatement per acre 
while pijk represents the benefits per acre with crop production. The difference,  mij, represents the net 
social benefit derived from the i
th land parcel. It is optimal to retire a land parcel from production, that is 
xij0*=a, only if the net social benefit from crop production are less than that can be obtained from land 
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On the other hand, the social planner is indifferent between crop production and retirement of a land 
parcel if:  
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In this case the optimal share of land under each activity is indeterminate and 0£xij1*£a. Condition (6) 
can be rearranged as follows to show that retirement of a land parcel from crop production is optimal if:   
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Since crop production is a more erosive activity, we have,  eij1>eij0 and the difference  (eij1-eij0)>0 










1  is also positive because we assume that more sediment cannot be loaded into the river 
than was generated on each of the land parcels. The product of these two terms [represented by the first 
term on the left-hand side of (9)] shows the off-site abatement of sediment generated on parcel i due to a 
change in its land use.  It represents the direct contribution of land retirement by parcel i to off-site 
abatement of sediment.  This term is large if the term  ) d (
i
m






1  is large and there are few or no 
downstream cells where the sediment generated by the i
th parcel can be deposited or if the deposition ratio 
of the downstream parcels is small. 
The second term on the left hand side of (9) is also positive because the term 
0 ij




¶ - >0. This 
term shows the indirect impact of land-use decisions by (upstream) parcel i on sediment deposition ratios 
downstream in a channel. This is because an increase in the share of the i
th land parcel that is retired 
reduces on-site erosion and volume of sediment flow to downstream parcels, thereby increasing the 
deposition ratio of each of the i-m cells.  The land-use decision of parcel  i reduces off-site sediment 
loadings by increasing the abatement potential of downstream cells. 
Together the terms on the left hand side of (9) indicates that a land parcel should retire from 
cropping activities either if it is close to the water-body and land retirement would have a large negative 
effect on its erosion generation or if it is an upstream cell but its land retirement decision would lead to a 
large improvement in the trapping efficiency of the downstream cells. Additionally, land retirement is 
optimal if the forgone quasi-rent from crop production is low.   9
  The analysis above also shows the fallacy of focusing only on retiring land in parcels with high 
on-site erosion.  If we focused only on reducing on-site erosion then land parcels where (eij1-eij0) is large 
should be retired from crop production. This would ignore the other terms on the left hand side in (9) 
which depend on the location of the land parcel in a flow path and on its impact on the deposition ratios 
of other parcels.  
The minimum per acre payment a landowner would be willing to accept to retire the i
th parcel is 
pij1. The maximum per acre payment the government would be willing to offer to induce retirement of the 
land is given by the expression on the left-hand side of (9) which represents the marginal social cost of 
crop production on that parcel. To the extent that there is a strict inequality in (9), the maximum payment 
that the social planner is willing to offer per acre of land enrolled would generate a surplus for the 
landowner that is enrolling his land in a conservation program. As can be seen, this maximum payment is 
a function of the contribution of a land parcel to off-site sediment abatement. This contribution consists of 
two parts, first being the amount of off-site damages due to on-site erosion generated that are reduced and 
second being the improvement in trapping efficiency it causes in the downstream cells by retiring from 
crop production. Therefore while the rental payment per ton of abatement is uniform across land parcels, 
the rental offer per acre needs to vary across parcels depending on their direct contribution to abatement 
and also on their indirect contribution in the form of an externality benefit to other parcels by increasing 
their trapping efficiency.  
 
III.   Empirical Model 
   
To empirically apply the conceptual model developed above, the entire watershed is partitioned 
into small management units that are grouped into run-off channels for sediment flow from upland areas 
to the river. The land parcels eligible for enrollment in CREP are restricted to those in the riparian buffer, 
defined here by the first three land parcels adjacent to the river in each flow path or run-off channel. The 
flow of run-off in any three-parcel channel is independent of that in adjacent channels. However, the 
deposition ratios for the parcels within a flow channel are dependent on landuse decisions and site-  10
specific characteristics of upstream parcels. We assume that each land parcel will be either fully cropped 
or fully retired from production.  
Typically this type of ‘either/or’ problems are formulated as mixed integer (binary) programming 
problems. However, the large number of land parcels (if the land parcels are to be sufficiently small to be 
homogenous entities in terms of their economic profitability and individual contribution to environmental 
pollution) in a typical watershed, the non-linear relationships between on-site erosion and off-site 
sediment loading, and the need to simultaneously determine the enrollment decision for each parcel and 
its endogenous deposition ratio would lead to a very large scale nonlinear integer programming model, 
which would be very difficult (if not impossible) to solve numerically.   
We therefore develop an empirical model that involves transforming the above problem into one 
with exogenously specified relationships between on-site erosion generation and off-site sediment loading 
for each flow channel as explained below. This is used to obtain optimal landuse patterns in the watershed 
to achieve given environmental constraints. We then use the optimal land-use decisions to obtain the 
deposition ratios for each land parcel while recognizing the interdependence between these ratios among 
land parcels in each flow channel.   Following that we determine each  land parcels contribution to 
abatement of sediment/nitrate loading in the watershed and the optimal per acre rental payment offers to 
individual parcels to achieve the optimal land use. 
The first step of determining the optimal land-use in the watershed is achieved as follows. Instead 
of defining a binary decision variable (i.e., enroll or not) for each parcel individually, we generate all 
possible combinations of enrollment decisions by land parcels in a flow channel. This leads to at most 8
 
(=2
3) different combinations of enrollment decisions that can be made for a 3-parcel channel
1. We denote 
these 8 alternative land-use plans for each channel of parcels by p=1,…,8 where p=1 corresponds to the 
CCC plan. The total profits with crop production for each channel, j=1,…J, under each of the land-use 
plans is the sum of the profits for each parcel and is denoted by Rpj. Let Epj  and Npj  denote the total 
                                                 
1 These combinations are GGG, GGC, GCG, GCC, CGG, CCG, CGC, and CCC where C denotes crop production 
and G denotes enrollment in a land retirement program that requires the planting of permanent grass cover.    11
sediment and nitrate generated, respectively, by channel j under plan p. Let  (1- dpj) and (1- qpj) denote the 
fractions of that sediment and nitrate that is loaded into the waterbody. Each dpj and qpj is exogenously 
fixed and represents the deposition ratio of a channel under land use plan  p. The choice between 
alternative plans is determined by introducing 0 £zpj£1,  an endogenous convex combination (weight) 





pj z . The ceilings on the 
maximum levels of sediment and nitrates that can be loaded into the water-body by the watershed are 
represented by  S  and  N  respectively. The algebraic model that determines the optimum enrollment 
option for all J flow paths is as follows: 
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pj z  for all j=1,..J                    
(14)      zpj ‡ 0 for all p, j                      
 
Note that the endogenous weight variables, zpj, are defined as continuous variables, and from (13) 
and (14) they can take any arbitrary value in the range of [0,1]. This means that for each channel the 
model solution can have a weighted sum of alternative enrollment plans for each channel, with the 
endogenous weights adding up to 1. However, in any feasible solution all zpj but one, have to take binary 
values, either 0 or 1. This can be seen as follows: The number of variables and constraints in the above 
model are 8J and J+2, respectively. Therefore, any basic feasible solution can have at most J+2 positive 
variables. Equation (14) implies that there is at least one positive variable for each channel, otherwise the 
sum cannot be equal to 1. These nonzero variables determine J of the J+2 basic variables, one variable 
belonging to each channel, and leaves only two remaining basic variables which may belong to a channel 
associated with any of the J channels.  Thus, except for these two channels, for all other channels we must 
have zpj =1 for some option p and  zpj =0 for all other options. Moreover, for those two channels we can   12
have either two nonzero zpj’s in each channel or three nonzero zpj’s in one channel and only one nonzero 
zpj in the other channel. Binary solutions for the enrollment choice variables for all channels imply that the 
model may select one of the p plans for flow path j rather than a mixed enrollment option. Therefore, after 
rounding the non-binary solution for that single channel to a binary solution, we obtain a pure binary 
optimum solution which very closely approximates the true binary solution of the enrollment problem 
that would be obtained from an integer programming formulation (where zpj’s would be defined as binary 
variables). The error involved in this approach is negligibly small, but the convenience of this 
approximation procedure is enormous. First, linear programming allows us to solve the model regardless 
of its dimensions (i.e., the number of channels and enrollment plans). Second, a shadow price 
interpretation of the optimum solution, which is important for determining economic policy incentives as 
will be elaborated below, is now possible, unlike in the case of an integer programming formulation. 
The shadow prices s  and r associated with constraints (11) and (12) represent the marginal cost 
of sediment and nitrate abatement to the constrained levels. It can be shown
2 that the term s[(1-dpj)Epj-(1-
d1j) E1j]+ r[(1-qpj)Npj-(1-q1j) N1j] for p=2,..8, represents the maximum payment that the social planner 
would be willing to offer flow path  j for choosing the land use option p>1 and enrolling at least one 
parcel rather than choosing the CCC option. This payment would be sufficient to induce flow path j to 
choose plan p.  
The solution to this model provides the optimum shadow price information to determine an 
appropriate price incentive, a uniform price s per unit of sediment abatement and r per unit of nitrate 
abatement, that can be offered to each flow channel to choose plan p.  To distribute the total payment 
among individual parcels contained in each flow channel, we need to disaggregate the contribution of 
each parcel to the total abatement achieved by the flow channel. The procedure used to do so is explained 
here by using a specific example to estimate the contribution of each land parcel to sediment abatement. 
Suppose for instance that the plan GGC is found to be optimal for a particular flow channel. This means 
                                                 
2.  Proof of this is a straightforward matter and requires standard linear programming theory and optimality 
conditions. Therefore, it is not explained in detail here, but available upon request.   13
that the first two parcels adjacent to the river should be targeted for enrollment and the third parcel 
(farthest from the river) should not be targeted. The total abatement can be allocated to the three parcels 
by considering the sediment/nitrate loading that would have been achieved under the GGC, CGC and 
CCC options. For example, in the case of sediment loading, let S1j be the sediment loading under plan 
p=1 (that is, CCC) and  S2j be the sediment loading achieved by switching to the CGC plan. The 
difference between the two can be interpreted as the sediment abatement achieved by the land retirement 
decision of the middle parcel alone. Then, the payment for that parcel for sediment abatement must be 
s(S1j-S2j). If S3j is the sediment loading under the GGC plan, then  S2j-S3j is the  sediment abatement 
contribution of the first parcel (adjacent to the river), and therefore the payment for that cell must be 
s(S2j-S3j). Note that since s(S1j-S2j)+ s(S2j-S3j)=s(S1j-S3j) corresponds to the total payment made to the 
channel  j, the sum of payments for individual parcels equals the total payment for the entire 3-parcel 
channel. Similarly, the contribution of each land parcel’s land use decision to nitrate abatement by each 
channel and the rental payment to be offered to it can be determined. 
IV.  Data 
 
The 67,717 acre Court Creek watershed located in Knox county, Illinois was selected for our 
empirical application.  Typical of the watersheds within CREP, Court Creek is a highly productive 
agricultural watershed with nutrient- and sediment-impaired waters.  Cropland comprises 46 percent; 
grassland, 24 percent; woodland, 27 percent; and urban, water and miscellaneous land uses the remaining 
3 percent.  We partitioned Court Creek into 300-by-300 foot parcels (2.07 acres per parcel), creating a 
total of 29,815 parcels or individual decision units.  This parcel size was chosen because it leads to 
parcels that are relatively homogenous in their soil characteristics and slope while also ensuring that the 
number of land parcels does not exceed the upper limit for total number of cells imposed by the 
Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution (AGNPS) model, the hydrologic model we use to predict non-
point source pollutant loadings in agricultural watersheds. Furthermore, the first three of these 300 square 
feet parcel generally capture most of the floodplains of the tributaries of the Illinois River and therefore   14
are eligible for enrollment in CREP. 
  A mix of GIS data, publications, and expert advice were used to parameterize AGNPS to reflect 
hydrological conditions in the watershed.  A satellite image of the watershed was used to assign landuse 
to the parcels (Illinois Department of Natural Resources, 1996).  This initial  distribution of landuse also 
became our base for judging performance among the various policy alternatives.  Digital Elevation Model 
(DEM) data from the US Geological Survey (1996) were collected and subroutines were written that 
assigned slope and slope length to every parcel.  We wrote another subroutine that used each parcel’s 
slope and aspect to create 2,318 flow paths or channels ranging in length between one parcel and 3 
parcels to capture the flow of runoff water in the CREP eligible region of the watershed. Of these flow 
paths, 277 consisted of only 1 parcel, 563 consisted of two parcels and 1,478 consisted of 3 land parcels
3.  
Other AGNPS parameters including Curve Number (CN), Manning’s coefficient (N), surface 
condition coefficient (SC), cropping factor (C), conservation factor (P), and chemical oxygen demand 
(COD) were obtained from USDA publications (USDA, 1972, 1986) and adjusted by state Natural 
Resource Conservation Service (NRCS) professionals to take into account local conditions.  Knox 
County’s Soil Survey (1995) provided the necessary soil characteristics such as soil texture and 
erodibility.   We obtained rainfall data from the Illinois State Water Survey (Huff and Angle, 1989).   
  Farm financial and production data were developed for a 700-acre grain farm, the averaged-sized 
commercial operation in Northwestern Illinois (White 1995, Siemens 1998). Acreage was split equally 
between corn and soybean production with corn and soybeans being planted using reduced-till
4 and no-
till
5 systems, respectively.  We used production guidelines in the Illinois Agronomy Handbook (1999) to 
identify initial seed, fertilizer and other input levels.  The publication “Soil Productivity in Illinois” 
(1978) combined with expert advice from a soils expert (Olson, 1999) helped us to determine crop yields 
by soil type and slope and to fine-tune fertilizer use with expected yields.  For corn, estimated crop yields 
varied between 82 and 188 bushels per acre; for soybeans, between 26 and 60 bushels per acre.  A 
                                                 
3. For paths with less than 3 parcels, the number of enrollment options are 4 (=2
2) and 2 for single parcel paths.  
4. Reduced-till has less intensive operations on soil than conventional tillage such as smaller cultivation equipment.   15
machinery program developed by Siemens (1998) was used to identify suitable machinery sets and their 
associated costs.  We collected 1998 output and input prices from various state sources. Using this data, 
we constructed crop budgets and calculated quasi-rents, defined as total revenues minus total variable 
costs, for all combinations of soils and slopes.  Estimated per acre revenues, variable costs, and quasi 
rents for our representative 700-acre corn and soybean farm ranged between $221 and $345, $160 and 
$191, and $61 and $154, respectively.  Again, subroutines were written that aggregated production and 
financial information and assigned it to each of the parcels.  
             Of the 29,815 parcels in the watershed, only 5,837 parcels (12,083 acres) fall within 900 feet of a 
stream on either side.  In some cases, one or more of these parcels were currently non-cropland such as 
woodland or grassland, in which case their land-use was kept as such and they were not considered 
eligible for enrollment. This left us with 3,948 parcels with 8,172 acres of cropland that were eligible to 
enroll in CREP.  
  Summary statistics for the eligible CREP land parcels are provided in Table 1. As shown there 
the land parcels differed considerably in their slopes, quasi-rents per acre, their on-site erosion and nitrate 
generation and their slopes. While 41% of watershed is gently sloped with slope under 2%, there is still 
considerable variability in slope with a range 0.5% to 15%. The amount of sediment reaching each 3-
parcel channel also varied across the channels between 0 and 63 tons.  While some parcels had very 
erodible soil and generated 55 tons of on-site erosion others were less erodible  and generated only 1.1 
tons of on-site erosion. 
 
V.   Results 
 
The 3,948 land parcels that were considered eligible for enrollment in CREP covered an area of 
8,172 acres and earned a total quasi-rent of $ 909,926 per year with soybeans on half the acreage beans 
and corn on the other half using reduced tillage. With a 5-year storm event leading to 3.73  inches of 
rainfall for 12 hours, a run-off of 18,640 tons of sediment and 15,083 pounds of nitrates would be loaded 
                                                                                                                                                             
5. No-till does not allow operations that disturb the soil other than the planting or drilling operation.   16
into water-body in the watershed given its existing pattern of land-use. The optimization model was run 
with both sediment and nitrate constraints restricting each type of pollutant to 10%, 15%, 20%, 25% and 
30% of base levels for three different storm events (5 year, 25 year and 50 year events). In each case, we 
found that the corresponding nitrate constraint was not binding, in that achievement of the sediment 
abatement goal led to over achievement of the nitrate abatement goal. To achieve the 20% sediment 
abatement goal under 5-year storm events, the optimal model determines that 11% of the eligible acreage 
and land parcels should be targeted for enrollment in CREP (Table 2). 
A comparison of the land parcels that should optimally be selected for enrollment under 5-year 
storm events with those that are eligible but not selected shows that 68% of the selected land parcels are 
adjacent to the river (Table 3). Only 5.3% of the selected parcels are the third parcel (furthest away from 
the river) in the 3 -parcel channel. The selected land parcels also have low productivity index and low 
quasi-rents on average as compared to the land parcels that are not selected for enrollment. Additionally, 
the selected parcels have much higher slope and on-site  erosion and nitrate run-off levels with crop 
production and belong to channels that are receiving a relatively larger volume of sediment inflows and 
nitrate inflows from upland areas. This indicates that although the off-site sediment contamination by a 
land parcel depends considerably on its on-site erosion levels and nitrate generation levels, it also depends 
on the location of the land parcel. The parcels selected are those right next to the river, that is those that 
did not have the benefit of having downstream parcels on which to deposit their sediment. Hence, 
selection of land parcels with high on-site erosion that are next to the river is optimal since it would have 
a substantial impact on reducing sediment loading in the river. Among the parcels with high contribution 
to the sediment loading, optimal targeting requires choosing those parcels with the lowest forgone 
benefits. As a result, the average quasi-rent of the selected cells is smaller than of the non-selected cells.  
Alternative Land Rental Payment Schemes 
To induce the selected land parcels to voluntarily retire land from crop production, policy makers 
could design a land-rental payment scheme that is based on a uniform payment per ton of abatement 
achieved by retiring the land parcel. Such a policy would be a cost-effective strategy for achieving the   17
given sediment and nitrate abatement goals. For achieving the 20% sediment and nitrate abatement goals, 
a land rental payment policy that offers $33.6/ton of abatement through land retirement would be cost-
effective. If information were available on the amount of abatement that retirement of a land parcel would 
achieve then the per acre payment that would accrue to that land parcel if retired could be determined 
(=$33.6 * abatement per acre). If this payment is greater than the quasi-rent per acre from crop production 
then it is optimal to retire the land from crop production. Given the heterogeneity in the quasi-rents and 
abatement potential of different land parcels in the watershed, rental payments based on this policy are 
likely to be greater than the quasi-rents per acre for all the inframarginal parcels selected by the optimal 
solution. For the marginal parcel that is selected, the land rental payment offered would be just equal to 
the quasi-rent per acre. Therefore the inframarginal land parcels will earn a surplus over and above their 
forgone quasi-rents. The total payment required for achieving the 20% sediment abatement goal is 
$125,260 annually. If instead of paying a uniform price per ton of abatement, the policy maker could 
practice perfect price discrimination in its rental payment per ton of abatement offer across the selected 
land parcels then the minimum payment need to retire land would be exactly equal to the forgone quasi-
rents from crop production. The costs of abatement incurred under such a p olicy would be $70,310 
annually. The difference $55,000 represents the surplus transferred to the landowners under a uniform 
$/ton abatement rental payment scheme.  
The implementation of the optimally targeted enrollment in CREP using uniform payments per 
ton of abatement requires information on the abatement that would be achieved by each land parcel 
retired from crop production. To implement the perfectly price discriminating rental payment scheme 
policy makers also need information on the quasi-rents per acre earned by each of the selected land 
parcels. The abatement per acre achieved by enrolling a land parcel depends not only on the site-specific 
characteristics of the land parcel, such as its slope, distance from river and soil type, but also on the land 
use decisions made by parcels upstream and downstream from it in the run-off channel which are 
themselves endogenous to the land rental payment scheme that is offered.   18
To quantify the impact of various site-specific characteristics on abatement by the optimally 
targeted parcels and determine rental payments to the selected parcels, we disaagregated the total 
abatement achieved by each 3-parcel channel into the contribution of each parcel in that channel retired 
from crop production. We then examined the factors that influenced the magnitude of these ex post rental 
payments to the selected land parcels by regressing them on observable site-specific characteristics. The 
results of this regression are presented in Table 4. In Model I only the selected land parcels, that is those 
with non-zero land rental payments, are included. In Model II all eligible land parcels are included, that 
is, even those that receive a zero land rental offer under the optimal solution. The results obtained using 
both Models I and II show that abatement and therefore rental payment offers should increase as the 
distance of the parcel from the river decreases, as the slope of the parcel increases and as its erodibility 
index increases. Land parcels in channels that receive a larger volume of sediment inflow from upland 
areas should also be offered larger rental payments to induce enrollment. The results of Model I and II 
differ in the direction of impact of the productivity index of the land parcels on rental payment offers 
made to them. Model I shows that among the selected land parcels, the rental payment offered increases 
as the productivity index and therefore the forgone quasi-rent per acre of that parcel increases. Model II 
shows that among all eligible land parcels, land rental payments decrease as the productivity increases, 
because it is optimal to provide greater incentives for the less productive land parcels to enroll first.  
Uniform Land Rental Payment per Acre 
The implementation of a land rental payment scheme that depends on the abatement achieved by 
each land parcels is difficult to implement due to its informational requirements and due to the 
endogeneity of the abatement level to the land-use decisions made by other land parcels in the run-off 
channel.  Policy makers may therefore choose a simpler land rental payment scheme based on uniform 
payments per acre of land retired. Such a policy would encourage land parcels with quasi-rents per acre 
that are lower than the uniform payment per acre to enroll. The pattern of enrollment generated by this 
policy is unlikely to replicate the optimal land retirement decisions because the land parcels with the 
lowest quasi-rents per acre may not be those that have the largest abatement potential. We find that a   19
payment of $83.5 per acre is needed to induce land retirement such that the sediment abatement constraint 
of 20% can be achieved. This land rental payment reduces nitrate generation by 21%. The acreage that 
needs to be enrolled to achieve the 20% abatement goal is 28% larger than under the uniform $/ton of 
abatement land rental scheme. Although total government payments (Rent $/Acre times number of acres) 
is smaller than with the optimal targeting, the costs of abatement (forgone quasi-rents due to land 
retirement) are 38% higher than with the other land rental policy.  
The uniform rental payment per acre enrolled policy does not create incentives to retire land 
parcels based on their contribution to abatement of sediment loadings and as a result the percentage of 
retired land parcels adjacent to the river is smaller than in the case of the optimal land rental payment 
scheme.  Of the land parcels retired to achieve the 20% sediment abatement, 19.5% are parcels furthest 
from the river while 37% are the middle land parcels and only 44% are those closest to the river. As 
shown in Table 3, the targeted parcels under the $/acre enrolled policy are on average further from the 
river, had flatter slopes, smaller on-site erosion and nitrate run-off and belonged to channels that on 
average are receiving smaller sediment and nitrate run-off from upland areas in the watershed. As a result, 
the abatement efficiency of this pattern of land retirement per acre of land retired and per dollar of 
forgone quasi-rents is much smaller than under the optimal policy. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
We examine the sensitivity of the pattern of land retirement and costs of abatement to the desired 
abatement target for sediment and nitrate loadings in the river and to the intensity of the rainfall event. As 
shown in Table 2, as the abatement target becomes more stringent, costs of abatement increase steeply 
under both the optimal land rental policy and the uniform $/acre rental policy. The cost of abatement 
curve is upward sloping and convex as expected from our theoretical model and these costs are not very 
sensitive to the rainfall event considered. Figure 1 shows that costs  of abatement for given percentage 
levels of sediment abatement increase as the intensity of the  storm event increases. However, the 
difference in these costs across storm events is not very significant. At all levels of abatement, costs of   20
abatement  are higher under the $/acre rental payment policy than under the $/ton abatement rental 
payment policy as shown in Fig. 2 and Table 2. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
Soil conservation programs are increasingly targeting land retirement to achieve off-site sediment 
abatement and improvements in water quality rather than reduction in on-site erosion. The relationship 
between on-site erosion and off-site damages is dependent not only on the volume of on-site erosion but 
on the site-specific characteristics of the intervening land parcels in the path of the sediment flow and the 
landuse decisions made by those intervening land parcels. Land parcels that are closer to the water-body 
trap sediment flowing from upland parcels and provide an externality benefit to those upland parcels by 
reducing the off-site damages due to sediment generated on those upland parcels and should be 
compensated for it.  
  This paper develops a framework to determine the optimal pattern of land retirement in a 
watershed to achieve sediment and nitrate run-off abatement at least cost. By integrating detailed GIS data 
with a hydrologic model, this framework incorporates the inter-dependence between the sediment 
deposition ratios of land parcels in a run-off channel. It develops an economic model that incorporates 
this endogenous relationship between on-site erosion and off-site sediment loading from a land parcel for 
identifying the land parcels that should be targeted by a social planner for enrollment in a cost-effective 
soil conservation program.  
  The empirical results show that retirement of only 11 percent of the eligible cropland is sufficient 
to meet the program’s 20 percent sediment abatement goal under a typical storm event in that region. This 
also reduces nitrate run-off by 22.5 percent, thus achieving CREP’s second goal of nitrate reduction. We 
find that the optimal targeting of the program should be towards land parcels that have higher slope, are 
closer to the river and less productive in crop production. Additionally, downstream land parcels that are 
in the run-off path for a larger number of upland parcels, thus offer greater sediment trapping benefits 
relative to other land parcels, should be given higher priority when targeting CREP enrollment.   21
The implementation of the social planner’s choice in a decentralized setting requires the provision 
of economic incentives to land owners to voluntarily retire their land. The paper analyzes the properties of 
the optimal rental payment mechanism required to achieve cost-effective abatement and shows that rental 
payment offers need to vary with the spatial location and characteristics of the land parcels. Such a policy 
would be difficult to implement due to its informational requirements. Instead, soil conservation programs 
have typically offered uniform $/acre rental payments to landowners. We find that the cost of achieving 
20% sediment and nitrate abatement under a uniform rental payment policy that ignores differences in 
location and slope as well as the endogenous sediment deposition ratios is 38% higher than that with the 
optimally targeted enrollment. Finally, sensitivity results show that costs of abatement increase 
significantly as the environmental goals become more stringent and seek reductions in sediment above the 
20% abatement level.   
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          Table 1   Summary Statistics for Eligible CREP Land in the Court Creek Watershed 
 
Variable          Mean  
   (Std. Dev) 
  Minimum   Maximum 
Quasi-rent ($/Parcel)        230.5 
     (68.1) 
     125.8      319.6 
Distance from river (Feet)        585.3 
     (236.1) 
         0       900 
Slope (%)         3.3 
      (3.5) 
        0.5         15 
Erodibility Index        0.34 
     (4.44) 
       0.14       0.39 
Sediment flow from upland to each 3-parcel channel 
(Tons) 
      2.68 
     (4.44) 
         0       62.9 
Nitrate flow from upland to each 3-parcel channel 
(lbs) 
     13.94 
    (10.91) 
       0.25     51.67 
On-Site Erosion (Tons)         8.8 
      (9.3) 
        1.1      55.4 
On-Site Nitrate Run-off (lbs)        26.9 
    (14.5) 
       26.9       97.1 
Productivity Index       127.5 
     (20.3) 
       65.3     153.8 
No. of eligible land parcels  3,948 
No. of eligible land parcels in Position 1,2,3
(1)  1,324, 1,494, 1,130 
Eligible Acres  8,172.4 
(1)Position 1 represents the one next to the river while Position 3 represents the one furthest from the river. 
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 Table 2:  Costs of Abatement for Alternative Abatement Levels with a 5-year Storm Event
1:    
                      Comparison of results with optimal targeting and uniform land rental offers 
 
Sediment Abatement Goal         10.0%    15.0%    20.0%    25.0%    30.0% 
Optimal Targeting of CREP 
Nitrate Abatement Achieved  12.0%  16.5%  22.5%  27.3%  32.7% 
Acreage Enrolled (acres)   310.5  565.1  900.5  1347.6  1966.5 
Number of Land Parcels      150       273       435        651       950 
Number of Land parcels grouped      1 
by position in the channel
2                2 




     204 
60 
9 
     296 
     116 







Loss of Quasi-rent (‘ 000 $)  23.25  43.2    70.31  108. 64  166.31 
Government Payment with uniform price 
per unit of abatement  (‘000 $) 
33.87  70.48      125.26  234.76  434.59 
Average Cost of Abatement ($/Ton)      12.5       15.5       18.9       23.4       29.8 
Marginal Cost of Abatement ($/Ton)  18.2  25.3  33.6  50.5  77.9 
Rental Payment Per Acre ($/Acre)     109.1     125.6      139.1      174.2      221.0 
  Uniform $/Acre  Land Rental Payment Policy   
Nitrate Abatement Achieved  10.9%  16.0%  21.1%  26.6%  31.7% 
Acreage Enrolled (acres)  486.5  784.5  1,244.1  1,707.8  2,647.5 
Number of Land Parcels     235       385  601       825     1,282 
Number of Land parcels grouped      1 
by position in the channel                  2 
                                                           3 
   115 
    77 
    43 
     180 
     139 




     339 
     310 
     176 
     465 
     501 
     306 
Loss of Quasi-rent (‘ 000 $)  35.59  58. 93  97.21  135.94  217.89 
Government Payment with uniform price 
per acre  (‘000 $) 
36.16  65.54  103.93  142.67  233.25 
Average Cost of Abatement ($/Ton)      19.1       21.1       26.1       29.2       39.0 
Rental Payment Per Acre ($/acre)  74.3  83.5  83.5  83.5  88.1 
1 A 5 year storm event represents 12 hours of rainfall amounting to 3.73 inches.   
  In the absence of any enrollment, the base level of sediment run-off is 18,604.0 tons and nitrate run-off  
  is 15083.0 lbs.  
2 Parcel 1 represents the one next to the river while Parcel 3 is furthest from the river 
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Table 3. Comparison of the Characteristics of the Targeted vs. Non-Targeted  Land Parcels  
                     Under Alternative Land Rental Schemes for 20% Sediment Abatement 
 
  Targeted  Non-Targeted  Targeted  Non-Targeted 
Variable   Optimal Land Rental  
($/Ton of Abatement) 
Uniform Land Rental 
($/Acre of Enrollment) 
Quasi-rent ($/Parcel)     161.8         319.6     161.7         242.8 
Distance from river (Feet)     411.7         606.8     527.6         595.6 
Slope (%)      10.1             2.5         9.5             2.2 
Erodibility Index      0.37           0.33       0.37           0.33 
Sediment flow from upland to each 
3-parcel channel (Tons) 
    5.19           2.37       4.10           2.42 
Nitrate flow from upland to each 3-
parcel channel (lbs) 
    14.0            4.4       12.5           4.2 
On-Site Erosion (Tons)      28.3            6.4       25.2          5.89 
On-Site Nitrate Run-off (lbs)      58.4           20.7       53.4         19.7 
Productivity Index    108.6          129.9     108.7        130.9 
Acres (%)       11             89       15.2          84.8 
Land Parcels (%)       11            89       15.2           84.8 
First Parcels Selected (%)     68.0           29.3       43.6          31.7 
Second Parcels Selected (%)     26.7           39.2       36.9          38.0 
Third Parcels Selected (%)      5.3           31.5       19.5          30.3 
 
         Table 4:  Determinants of the Optimal Land Rental Payments for Enrollment 
Dependent Variable: Optimal Rental Payment Per Parcel 
Independent Variables                Model 1                    Model II 
Intercept              -724.16 
            (594.96) 
                    66.82 
                   (52.57) 
Distance from River                -0.253 
             (0.029)** 
                   -0.064 
                   (0.005)** 
Slope of Parcel                 22.15 
              (2.44)** 
                    17.22 
                    (0.39)** 
Erodibility Index                1403.0 
             (1037.3)* 
                   -72.03 
                   (85.46) 
Sediment from upland parcels                 0.999 
             (0.638)* 
                      1.21 
                    (0.27)** 
Productivity Index                  3.40 
              (2.00)**  
                     -0.27 
                     (0.19)*   
No. of Observations                  435                       3513 
R
2                 0.28                       0.46  
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